Skip to content

Navigating the Complexities of Workers’ Compensation Claims: The Apelu Case and Its Implications for Psychiatric Injury Assessment

Navigating the Complexities of Workers' Compensation Claims: The Apelu Case and Its Implications for Psychiatric Injury Assessment

Two cases, Apelu v Lusty Tip Trailers Pty Ltd [2023] QSC 262 and Apelu v Lusty Tip Trailers Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 158, involve a worker seeking damages for injuries sustained in a workplace accident, including both physical and psychiatric injuries.

The first case, [2023] QSC 262, is the initial decision made by the Supreme Court of Queensland. In this case, the plaintiff (Apelu) sought declaratory relief to establish his right to pursue damages for a psychiatric injury, including schizophrenia, in addition to his already accepted post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The primary judge, Brown J, dismissed the plaintiff’s application, finding that the notice of assessment issued for PTSD did not encompass schizophrenia and that schizophrenia could not be considered a “secondary injury” to the accepted injuries.

The second case, [2024] QCA 158, is the Court of Appeal’s decision on Apelu’s appeal of the Supreme Court’s ruling. The Court of Appeal, consisting of Bond and Boddice JJA and Crowley J, upheld the primary judge’s decision and dismissed the appeal. The appellate court agreed with the lower court’s interpretation of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) and its application to the facts of the case.

Both decisions centred on the interpretation and application of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), particularly focusing on the process for assessing injuries, issuing notices of assessment, and determining a worker’s entitlement to seek damages for specific injuries.

The key issue in both cases was whether the plaintiff could claim damages for schizophrenia as part of his psychiatric injury, given that it was not explicitly included in the original notice of assessment.

Relevant Legislation

The cases centred on the interpretation and application of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (WCRA). Key provisions include:

  • Section 32: Defines “injury” as personal injury arising out of employment, with different thresholds for physical and psychiatric injuries.
  • Section 179: Outlines the process for assessing permanent impairment, including separate assessments for psychiatric and physical injuries.
  • Section 237: Limits who can seek damages for an injury, requiring a notice of assessment or meeting certain other criteria.
  • Section 239A: Allows workers to seek damages for injuries without a notice of assessment in certain circumstances.
  • Section 500: Allows insurers to refer matters to the Medical Assessment Tribunal (MAT) for decisions on medical matters.
  • Section 515: States that MAT decisions on medical matters referred under s 500 are final and cannot be questioned in court.

Check if you’re eligible for a Compensation Claim

Find out if your injury or illness is eligible to make a compensation claim. Your online check only takes 3 minutes.

Application of Law to Facts

The plaintiff suffered a head injury at work and was subsequently diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and schizophrenia. WorkCover Queensland accepted the PTSD claim and issued a notice of assessment for it, but did not accept or assess the schizophrenia. The MAT assessed only the PTSD and stated that the schizophrenia was not work-related.

The key legal questions for the Court were:

  1. Whether the notice of assessment for PTSD was sufficient to allow the plaintiff to claim damages for schizophrenia.
  2. Whether the schizophrenia could be considered a “secondary injury” not requiring separate assessment.
  3. Whether WorkCover was required to make a decision on whether schizophrenia was an “injury” under the WCRA.

The courts found:

  1. The notice of assessment for PTSD did not encompass schizophrenia. Section 179(4) of the WCRA, which refers to assessing “the psychiatric or psychological injury” in the singular, does not mean all psychiatric conditions are treated as a single injury. Where discrete conditions are identified, each requires separate assessment.
  2. The “secondary injury” principle from Barraclough v WorkCover Queensland [2012] QDC 321 did not apply here, as the medical evidence did not overwhelmingly support schizophrenia being a consequence of the original injury.  In Barraclough v WorkCover Queensland, the court endorsed a less literal and more expansive interpretation of what constitutes an “injury” for the purposes of workers’ compensation claims. The issue in Barraclough was whether reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) was a separate injury requiring its own notice of assessment, or whether it could be considered part of the original accepted injury. The court found that RSD was not a separate injury, but rather a progression or manifestation of the original accepted injury. This decision established an important principle that subsequent conditions or symptoms can be considered part of the original compensable injury if there is a clear causal connection, even if they were not specifically mentioned in the original notice of assessment. The court emphasised looking at the substance of the injury rather than getting caught up in precise descriptions or labels. This more flexible approach aims to avoid unfairly excluding legitimate claims due to overly technical interpretations of injury descriptions. In the Apelu v Lusty Tip Trailers decisions, the courts considered but distinguished the Barraclough principle. They found that unlike the RSD in Barraclough, the plaintiff’s schizophrenia was treated as a separate and distinct condition from his PTSD by medical experts and the Medical Assessment Tribunal. The courts determined that in this case, the schizophrenia could not be considered merely a progression or manifestation of the accepted PTSD injury, and therefore required its own separate assessment and notice before damages could be claimed for it.
  3. While WorkCover was not prevented by the MAT’s decision from considering schizophrenia as an injury under s 239A, the notice of claim did not clearly raise schizophrenia as an injury requiring such consideration.

The courts also clarified that the MAT’s statement about schizophrenia not being work-related was not a binding decision under s 515, as determining whether schizophrenia was an “injury” was not part of the medical matter referred to the MAT.

Why was the schizophrenia treated as a separate and distinct condition from his PTSD?

Conflicting medical evidence – There were differing medical opinions on whether the schizophrenia was work-related or caused by the original injury. Some doctors opined it was not work-related, while others like Professor McFarlane argued there was a causal link. The court noted there was no “overwhelming” medical view supporting causation, unlike in some previous cases.

MAT assessment – The Medical Assessment Tribunal (MAT) specifically found that the schizophrenia was not work-related, and treated it as a separate condition from the accepted PTSD injury. The MAT only assessed PTSD as the work-related psychiatric injury.

Timing – The schizophrenia was diagnosed separately and after the original PTSD injury had been accepted and assessed. It was not part of the original accepted injury.

Separate conditions – The court viewed PTSD and schizophrenia as two discrete psychiatric conditions, rather than schizophrenia being a progression or manifestation of the original PTSD injury.

Lack of clear evidence – The court found there was insufficient evidence to show the schizophrenia was a secondary consequence of the original physical injuries or PTSD, unlike in some previous cases where a clear progression was established.

So in essence, the conflicting medical evidence and the way the conditions were treated as separate by the MAT and WorkCover meant the court did not find a clear causal link had been established between the schizophrenia and the original compensable injury. The burden was on the plaintiff to prove this connection, which the court found had not been met based on the evidence presented.

Impact on Future Claimants

This decision has several implications for future compensation claimants:

  1. Multiple psychiatric conditions may be treated as separate injuries requiring individual assessment and notices of assessment. Claimants should ensure all alleged psychiatric injuries are clearly identified and referred for assessment.
  2. The “secondary injury” principle has limited application. Strong medical evidence linking the secondary condition to the original injury is required.
  3. Claimants must clearly identify all alleged injuries in their notice of claim to trigger the insurer’s obligation to consider them under s 239A.
  4. MAT decisions are only binding on matters specifically referred to them. This may provide some flexibility for claimants to argue for acceptance of injuries not explicitly assessed by the MAT.
  5. The statutory review process under Chapter 13 of the WCRA remains an important avenue for claimants dissatisfied with an insurer’s failure to make decisions on alleged injuries.

These decisions emphasise the importance of clearly identifying and seeking assessment for all alleged injuries early in the claims process. They also highlight the complex interplay between medical evidence, administrative decisions, and statutory interpretation in workers’ compensation cases. Future claimants and their representatives will need to navigate these complexities carefully to ensure all potential injuries are properly considered and assessed.

Check if you’re eligible for a Compensation Claim

Find out if your injury or illness is eligible to make a compensation claim. Your online check only takes 3 minutes.

We’re estate & compensation legal experts, and we’re waiting to take your call. Get in touch with the legal professionals who care at ROC Legal.